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Abstract
Causal inference deals with identifying which
random variables “cause” or control other
random variables. Recent advances on the
topic of causal inference based on tools from
statistical estimation and machine learning
have resulted in practical algorithms for
causal inference. Causal inference has the po-
tential to have significant impact on medical
research, prevention and control of diseases,
and identifying factors that impact economic
changes to name just a few. However, these
promising applications for causal inference
are often ones that involve sensitive or per-
sonal data of users that need to be kept pri-
vate (e.g., medical records, personal finances,
etc). Therefore, there is a need for the de-
velopment of causal inference methods that
preserve data privacy. We study the problem
of inferring causality using the current, pop-
ular causal inference framework, the additive
noise model (ANM) while simultaneously en-
suring privacy of the users. Our framework
provides differential privacy guarantees for a
variety of ANM variants. We run extensive
experiments, and demonstrate that our tech-
niques are practical and easy to implement.
1 Introduction
Causal identification allows one to reason about how
manipulations of certain random variables (the causes)
affect the outcomes of others (the effects). Uncovering
these causal structures has implications ranging from
creating government policies to informing health-care
practices. Causal inference was motivated by the im-
possibility of randomized intervention experiments in
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many cases, and the ambiguity of conditional inde-
pendence testing [32, 25]. In the absence of interven-
tions, it attempts to discover the underlying causal re-
lationships of a set of random variables entirely based
on samples from their joint distribution. The field of
causal inference is now a mature research area, cover-
ing learning topics as diverse as supervised batch infer-
ence [19, 23, 26], time-series causal prediction [10], and
linear dynamical systems [30]. Many inference meth-
ods require only a regression technique and a way to
compute the independence between two distributions
given samples [13, 16].
One would hope that researchers could publicly release
their causal inference findings to inform individuals
and policy makers. One of the primary roadblocks to
doing so is that often causal inference is performed on
data that individuals may wish to keep private, such
as data in the fields of medical diagnosis, fraud detec-
tion, and risk analysis. Currently, no causal inference
method has formal guarantees about the privacy of
individual data, which may be able to be inferred via
attacks such as reconstruction attacks [3].
Arguably one of the best notion of privacy is differen-
tial privacy, introduced by Dwork et al. [6] and since
used throughout machine learning [4, 15, 20, 2, 5]. Dif-
ferential privacy guarantees that the outcome of an al-
gorithm only reveals aggregate information about the
entire dataset and never about the individual. An indi-
vidual who is considering to participate in a study can
be reassured that his/her personal information cannot
be recovered with extremely high probability.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate
private causal inference. We show that it is possible to
privately release the quantities produced by the highly-
successful additive noise model (ANM) framework by
adding small amounts of noise, as dictated by differ-
ential privacy. Furthermore, these private quantities,
with high probability, do not change the causal in-
ference result, so long as it is confident enough. We
demonstrate on a set of real-world causal inference
datasets how our privacy-preserving methods can be
readily and usefully applied.
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2 Related Work
Discovering the causal nature between random events
has captivated researchers and philosophers long be-
fore the formal developments of statistics. This in-
terest was formalized by Reichenbach & Reichenbach
[28] who argued that all statistical correlations in data
arise from underlying causal structures between the
concerned random variables. For example, the corre-
lation between smoking and lung cancer was found to
arise from a direct causal link [7].
One of the most popular causal inference alternatives
to conditional independence testing is the Additive
Noise Model (ANM) approach developed by Hoyer
et al. [13] and used in many recent works [35, 21, 18, 1].
ANMs, originally designed for inferring whether X →
Y or Y → X and later extended to large numbers of
random variables, work under the assumption that the
effect is a non-linear function of the cause plus inde-
pendent noise. ANMs are one of many proposed causal
inference methods in recent literature [16, 9, 19, 29]
Work by Spirtes et al. [32], Pearl [25] shows how to
determine if X → Y when these variables are a part
of a larger ‘causal network’, via conditional indepen-
dence testing. One downside to conditional indepen-
dence based approaches is that inherently they cannot
distinguish between Markov-equivalent graphs. Thus
it may be possible that a certain set of conditional
independences imply both X → Y and Y → X. Fur-
thermore, if X and Y are the only variables in the
causal network there is no conditional independence
test to determine whether X → Y or Y → X.
3 Background
Our aim is to protect the privacy of individuals who
submit personal information about two random vari-
ables of interest X and Y . Their information should
remain private when it is used to infer whether X
causes Y (X→Y ), or Y causes X (Y → X) using the
ANM framework. This personal information comes in
the form of i.i.d. samples {(xi, yi)}ni=1 from the joint
distribution PX,Y . We will assume that, 1. There is
no confounding variable Z that commonly causes or
is a common effect of X and Y . 2. X and Y do not
simultaneously cause each other.
3.1 Additive Noise Model
Deciding on the causal direction between two variables
X and Y from a finite sample set has motivated an
array of research [8, 17, 33, 13, 35, 22, 16, 18, 19].
Perhaps one of the most popular results is the Additive
Noise Model (ANM) proposed by Hoyer et al. [13]. The
ANM framework assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Two random variables X,Y with joint
density p(x, y) are said to ‘satisfy an ANM’ X → Y
if there exists a non-linear function f : R→R and a
random noise variable NY , independent from X, i.e.
X ⊥ NY , such that
Y = f(X) +NY .
As defined, an ANM X → Y implies a functional re-
lationship mapping X to Y , alongside independent
noise. In order for this model to be useful for causal
inference we would like the induced joint distribution
PX,Y for this ANM to be somehow identifiably differ-
ent from the one induced by the ANM Y → X. If so,
we say that the causal direction is identifiable [23]. If
not, we have no hope of recovering the causal direction
purely from samples under the ANM.
Hoyer et al. [13] showed that ANMs are generically
identifiable from i.i.d. samples from PX,Y (except for
a few special cases of non-linear functions f and noise
distributions). The intuition behind this is for the
X→Y ANM, consider for most non-linear f and (for
simplicity) 0-mean NY , the density p(y|x) has mean
f(x) with distribution given by NY . This implies that
p(y− f(x)|x) has distribution NY that is independent
of X. However, p(x− f−1(y)|y) is for many choices of
f and NY not independent of y.
Algorithm 1 ANM Causal Inference [23]
1: Input: train/test data {xi, yi}ni=1, {x′i, y′i}mi=1
2: Regress on training data, to yield fˆ , gˆ, such that:
3: fˆ(xi) ≈ yi, gˆ(yi) ≈ xi, ∀i
4: Compute residuals on test data:
5: r′Y := y
′ − fˆ(x′), r′X := x′ − gˆ(y′)
6: Calculate dependence scores:
7: sX→Y := s(x′, r′Y ), sY→X := s(y
′, r′X)
8: Return: sX→Y , sX→Y , and D, where
9: D =
{
X→Y if sX→Y < sY→X
Y →X if sX→Y > sY→X
3.2 Inferring Causality
Mooij et al. [23] give a practical algorithm for de-
termining the causal relationship between X and Y
(i.e., either X → Y or Y → X), as shown in Algo-
rithm 1. The first step is to partition the i.i.d. samples
into a training and a testing set. We use the train-
ing set to train the regression functions fˆ : X → Y
and gˆ : Y → X. We use the testing set to compute
the residuals r′Y = y
′ − fˆ(x′) and r′X := x′ − gˆ(y′).
If we have an ANM X → Y then the residual r′Y is
an estimate of the noise NY which is assumed to be
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independent of X. Therefore, we calculate the de-
pendence between the residual r′Y and the input x
′,
sX→Y := s(x′, r′Y ), and sY→X := s(y
′, r′X), using a
dependence score s(·, ·). If sX→Y is less than sY→X ,
then we declare X→Y , otherwise Y →X.
3.3 Dependence Scores
Crucially, the ANM approach hinges on the choice of
dependence score s(·, ·). There have been many pro-
posals, and we give a quick review of the most popular
methods (for a detailed review see Mooij et al. [23]).
Spearman’s ρ is a rank correlation coefficient that
describes the extent to which one random variable is a
monotonic function of the other. Specifically, imagine
independently sorting the observations {a1, . . . , am}
and {b1, . . . , bm} by value in increasing order. Let oai
be the rank of ai in the a-ordering, and similarly, o
b
i
for bi in the b-ordering. Then Spearman’s ρ is,
s(a,b) :=
∣∣∣∣∣1− 6
∑m
i=1 d
2
i
m(m2 − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣
where di :=(o
a
i − obi ) are the rank differences for a,b.
Kendall’s τ . Similar to Spearman’s ρ, the Kendall
τ rank score calls a pair of indices (i, j) concordant
if it is the case that ai > aj and bi > bj . Otherwise
(i, j) is called discordant. Then the dependence score
is defined as
s(a,b) :=
|C −D|
1
2m(m− 1)
where C is the number of concordant pairs and D is
the number of discordant pairs.
HSIC Score. The first proposed score for the ANM
causal inference is based on the Hilbert-Schmidt In-
dependence Criterion (HSIC) [11], which was used by
Hoyer et al. [13]. They compute an estimate of the
p-value of the HSIC under the null hypothesis of in-
dependence, selecting the causal direction having the
lower p-value. Alternatively, one can use an estimator
to the HSIC value itself:
s(a,b) := ĤSICkθ(a),kθ(b)(a,b) (1)
where kθ is a kernel with parameters θ. Mooij et al. [23]
show that under certain assumptions the algorithm in
section 1 with the HSIC dependence score is consistent
for estimating the causal direction in an ANM.
Variance Score. When the noise variables in the
ANM are Gaussian, the variance score was proposed
in Bu¨hlmann et al. [1], and defined as s(a,b) :=
logV(a) + logV(b). Changes to a single input value
can induce arbitrarily large changes to this score,
which makes the variance score ill suited to preserve
differential privacy.
IQR Score. We introduce a robust version of this
score by replacing the variance of the random vari-
ables with their interquartile range (IQR). The IQR is
the difference between the third and first quartiles of
the distribution and can be estimated empirically. We
defined the following IQR-based score:
s(a,b) := log IQR(a) + log IQR(b). (2)
3.4 Differential Privacy
We assume that the data set D = {(xi, yi)} contains
sensitive data that should not be inferred from the
release of the dependence scores. One of the most
widely accepted mechanisms for private data release is
differential privacy [6]. In a nutshell it ensures that
the released scores can only be used to infer aggregate
information about the data set and never about an
individual datum (xi, yi).
Let us define the Hamming distance between two data
sets dH(D, D˜) between two data sets D and D˜ as the
number of elements in which these two sets differ. If a
data set D is changed to D˜, a distance dH(D, D˜) ≤ 1
implies that at most one element was added, removed,
or substituted.
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-
differentially private for , δ ≥ 0 if for all O ∈
Range(A) and for all neighboring datasets D, D˜ with
dH(D, D˜) ≤ 1 we have that
Pr
[A(D) = O] ≤ e Pr[A(D˜) = O]+ δ. (3)
One of the most popular methods for making an algo-
rithm (, 0)-differentially private is the Laplace mecha-
nism [6]. For this mechanism we must define an inter-
mediate quantity called the global sensitivity, ∆A
describing how much A changes when D changes,
∆A := max
D,D˜⊆X s.t. dH(D,D˜)≤1
|A(D)−A(D˜)|.
The Laplace mechanism hides the output of A with a
small amount of additive random noise, large enough
to hide the impact of any single datum (xi, yi).
Definition 3. Given a dataset D and an algorithm A,
the Laplace mechanism returns A(D)+ω, where ω is
a noise variable drawn from Lap(0,∆A/), the Laplace
distribution with scale parameter ∆A/.
It may be that the global sensitivity of an algorithm
A is unbounded in general, but can be bounded in the
context of a specific data set D over all neighbors D˜.
For such datasets we can bound the local sensitivity
∆(D)A := max
D˜⊆X s.t. dH(D,D˜)≤1
|A(D)−A(D˜)|.
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Table 1: Dependence scores and their privacy.
A checkmark indicates that there exist meaningful
bounds on either the global or local sensitivity.
Test Training
Global Local Global Local
Score Sense. Sense. Sense. Sense.
Spearman’s ρ X X - X
Kendall’s τ X X - X
HSIC X X X X
IQR - X - X
If an algorithm has bounded global sensitivity it cer-
tainly has bounded local sensitivity. Nissim et al.
[24], Dwork & Lei [4], Jain & Thakurta [14] show how
to use the local sensitivity to cleverly produce private
quantities for datasets with bounded local sensitivity.
4 Test Set Privacy
The data is partitioned into training and test set,
which are used in different ways. We therefore in-
troduce mechanisms to preserve training and test set
privacy respectively, which can be used jointly. Specif-
ically, we show how to privatize the dependence scores
sX→Y , sY→X . The reason for this is four-fold: 1. Pri-
vatizing the dependence score immediately privatizes
the causal direction D, because operations on differ-
entially private outputs preserve privacy (so long as
they do not touch the data). 2. Releasing the scores
indicates how confident the ANM method is about the
causal direction, which is absent from the binary out-
put D. 3. It is unclear which dependence score is best
for a particular dataset, so we privatize multiple scores
and leave this choice to the practitioner. In this section
we begin with test set privacy and describe training
set privacy in Section 5. Table 1 gives an overview of
test and training set privacy results for the dependence
scores that we consider.
Let (x′,y′) be the initial test data and (x˜′, y˜′) be the
test data after a single change in the dataset. Let
x˜′ = [x′1, . . . , x
′
k−1, x˜
′
k, x
′
k+1, . . . , x
′
m]
> and similarly
for y˜ so that this single change occurs at some index
k. The key to preserving privacy is to show that the
selected dependence score s(·, ·) can be privatized. We
show that if our dependence score is a rank correlation
coefficient (Spearman’s ρ, Kendall’s τ) or the HSIC
score [11], we can readily bound its test set global sen-
sitivity when applied to (x′,y′) versus (x˜′, y˜′). As the
IQR score has bounded test set local sensitivity we can
apply the algorithm of Dwork & Lei [4] for privacy.
4.1 Rank Correlation Coefficients
We first demonstrate global sensitivity for the two rank
correlation scores in Section 3.
Theorem 1. The rank correlation coefficients have
the following global sensitivities,
1. Let ρ(·, ·) be Spearman’s ρ score, then
|ρ(x′, r′Y )− ρ(x˜′, r˜′Y )| ≤
30
m
2. Let τ(·, ·) be Kendall’s τ score, then
|τ(x′, r′Y )− τ(x˜′, r˜′Y )| ≤
4
m
Proof. Our goal is to bound the following global sensi-
tivity in both scores: |s(x′, r′Y )−s(x˜′, r˜′Y )|. For Spear-
man’s ρ, suppose the change is on ak and bk, it is easy
to verify that 1) di changes by at most 2, for i 6= k; 2)
dk changes by at most m − 1; 3) di ≤ m − 1 for all i.
Since d2i − (di − 2)2 = 4(di − 1) ≤ 4(m− 2) for i 6= k,
the maximum change inside the summation is upper
bounded by (m − 1)(4m − 8) + (m − 1)2. Therefore,
global sensitivity of ρ is bounded by
6(m− 1)(5m− 3)
m(m2 − 1) ≤
30
m
.
For Kendall’s τ we can affect at most (m−1) pairs
by moving a single element of x′, as well as (m−1)
pairs for changing r′Y (either from concordant pairs to
discordant pairs, or vice versa). Therefore, the global
sensitivity of Kendall’s τ is
|s(x′, r′Y )− s(x˜′, r˜′Y )| ≤
2(m− 1)
1
2m(m− 1)
≤ 4
m
The bound on the global sensitivity ∆ of our scores en-
ables us to apply the Laplace mechanism [6] to produce
(2, 0)-differentially private scores: pX→Y , pY→X .
Specifically, we add Laplace noise Lap(0,∆/) to our
Spearman’s ρ and Kendall’s τ scores to preserve pri-
vacy w.r.t. the test set. Moreover, as a general prop-
erty of differential privacy we can compute any func-
tions on these private scores and, so long as they do
not touch the data, the outputs of these functions are
also private. This means that we can compute the in-
equality pX→Y < pY→X to decide if X causes Y or
vice-versa privately.
An important consideration is to what degree the addi-
tion of noise affects the true decision: sX→Y <sY→X .
Importantly, we can prove that, in certain cases, the
addition of Laplace noise required by the mechanism
is small enough to not change the direction of causal
inference. These are cases in which there is a large
‘margin’ between the scores sX→Y and sY→X . So long
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as this margin is large enough and in the correct or-
der the addition of Laplace noise has no effect on the
inference with high probability.
Theorem 2. Given two random variables X,Y who
have w.l.o.g. the causal relationship X → Y , assume
that they produce correctly-ordered scores: sX→Y <
sY→X , with margin γ = sY→X − sX→Y . Let
pX→Y , pY→X be these scores after applying the Laplace
mechanism [6] with scale σ = ∆/ then the probability
of correct inference with these private scores is,
P(pX→Y < pY→X) = 1− γ + 2σ
4σ
e−
γ
σ .
We leave the proof to the appendix. Note that the
probability of incorrect inference decreases nearly ex-
ponentially as the margin γ increases. This is a par-
ticularly nice property as the margin essentially de-
scribes the confidence of the (non-private) causal infer-
ence prediction: large γ corresponds to high confidence
in the inference. Additionally, there is an exponential
decrease as m and  grow. In section 6, we show on
real-world causal inference data that we can accurately
recover the true causal direction for a variety  settings.
4.2 HSIC Score
We begin by defining the empirical estimate of the
HSIC score given kernels k, l:
ĤSICk,l(x
′, r′Y ) :=
1
(m− 1)2 trace(KHLH) (4)
where Kij = k(x
′
i, x
′
j), Lij = l(r
′
Y,i, rY,j) and Hij =
δ{i=j} − 1/m. We assume k, l are bounded above by 1
(e.g., the squared exponential kernel, the Matern ker-
nel [27]). Our goal is to show that when we replace
(x′,y′) with (x˜′, y˜′) the global sensitivity is small.
Specifically we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The score in eq. (4) has a global sensi-
tivity of at most 16m−8(m−1)2 . Specifically,
|ĤSICk,l(x′, r′Y )− ĤSICk,l(x˜′, r˜′Y )| ≤
16m− 8
(m− 1)2
Proof. For simplicity define H(·, ·) := ĤSICk,l(·, ·).
Note that, as the trace is cyclic: trace(KHLH) =
trace(HKHL). Further, let K˜, L˜ be the kernels de-
fined on the modified data (x˜′, y˜′). Then as the data
is represented purely through the kernel matrices and
the trace is Lipschitz w.r.t. these matrices, we can
apply the triangle inequality to yield,
|H(x′, r′Y )−H(x˜′, r˜′Y )| ≤
‖HLH‖∞‖K − K˜‖1
(m− 1)2 +
‖HKH‖∞‖L− L˜‖1
(m− 1)2
To bound the infinity norms, let L = HLH, then
|Lij | =
∣∣∣∣∣Lij −
∑m
a=1 Laj
m
−
∑m
b=1 Lib
m
+
∑m
a,b=1 Lab
m2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 4
as Lij ≤ 1 (this inequality also holds for HKH). Fi-
nally, note that as there is only a single-element dif-
ference between (x′, r′Y ) and (x˜
′, r˜′Y ), we have that
‖K − K˜‖1 ≤ 2m− 1 (and also for L, L˜).
In fact, we can improve this bound to 12m−11(m−1)2 using
trace identities. We leave the proof of this to the ap-
pendix. Given this global sensitivity bound we can use
Theorem 2 to guarantee that under certain conditions
the Laplace mechanism w.h.p. does not change the
direction of causal influence.
4.3 IQR Score
Unfortunately the IQR does not have a bounded global
sensitivity, as there exist datasets for which the IQR
can change by an unbounded amount. Instead, Dwork
& Lei [4] offer an efficient technique to privately release
the IQR. We give a slightly modified version of their
Algorithm in the appendix.
First the algorithm defines two intervals B1 and B2
which both contain IQR(X). If the IQR were to be
pushed out of both of these intervals it would imply
that the IQR changed by a factor of e. Therefore we
loop over both intervals and calculate the number of
points Aj that an adversary would need to change to
push the IQR out of B1 or B2. Note that Aj is it-
self a data-sensitive query and so, to preserve privacy
of this query, we can add Laplace noise to it. Then,
if one of these noisy estimates Rj = Aj + z, where
z ∼ Lap(0, 1/) is larger than some threshold, it im-
plies that with high probability (exactly 1−δ), that the
IQR(X) has multiplicative sensitivity of at most e, for
the specific dataset X. Note that this is precisely the
local sensitivity as defined in Section 3, as it is specific
to X. This means that we can add Laplace noise z to
log IQR(X). If neither of the Rj are above the thresh-
old then the algorithm returns null: ⊥. This algorithm
was shown to be (3, δ)-differentially private.
In our case we would like to release four private IQR
scores. Note that we must look at x′ three separate
times: for IQR(x′), IQR(r′Y ), and IQR(r
′
X) (and three
times as well for y′). Therefore for both x′ and y′
we are composing three differentially private outputs.
Under simple composition this would lead to (9, 3δ)
differential privacy for both x′ and y′. However, we
can make use of Corollary 3.21 in Dwork & Roth [5] to
give (′, 3δ+ δ′)-differential privacy, for 0 < ′ < 1 and
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δ′ > 0, over three repeated mechanisms by ensuring
each private mechanism is (3, δ)-private, where 3 =
′/(2
√
6 log(1/δ′)).
The remaining question is whether this noise addi-
tion causes one to infer the incorrect causal direction.
Again, as long as there is a significant margin between
the scores, we can preserve the correct causal inference
with high probability as follows.
Theorem 4. Let Qx′ = log IQR(x
′), and similarly
for Qy′ , Qr′X , Qr′Y , be the true log-IQR scores. As well
let Px′ , Py′ , Pr′X , Pr′Y be the private versions, multiplied
by ez noise where z ∼ Lap(0, 1/). The the following
results hold:
1. [4] If the number of data-points needed to signif-
icantly change the IQR, Aj, is less than e then,
the probability that any one of the private IQR P∗
is released is small:
P
[
P∗ 6=⊥ |A1 or A2 ≤ e
]
≤ 3δ
2
.
2. If all private log-IQR scores are released, and the
relationship between the true scores holds Qx′ +
Qr′Y < Qy′ + Qr′X (which implies X → Y ), then
the probability that we make the correct causal in-
ference from the private scores is large,
P[Px′ + Pr′Y < Py′ + Pr′X ] =
1− e
−γ
σ
96σ3
(
48σ3 + 33σ2γ + 9σγ2 + γ3
)
where γ = Qy′ +Qr′X −Qx′ +Qr′Y , and σ = 1/.
The proof of these results is in the appendix. The first
result says that the probability that we release an IQR
score just because too much noise was added to Aj is
small. The second result says that with high probabil-
ity we recover the true causal direction, depending on
the size of the dataset.
5 Training Set Privacy
Let (x,y) be the initial training data and (x˜, y˜) be the
training data after a change in the dataset. Note that
x and x˜ differ in at most one element (similarly for
y and y˜). The length of both training datasets is n.
From Algorithm 1, the only way the training set can
affect the dependency scores sX→Y , sY→X is through
the regression functions fˆ , gˆ, used to compute test set
residuals r′Y , r
′
X . We use the kernel ridge regression
method and so the functions fˆ (and gˆ) can be writ-
ten in the form: fˆ(w, x) = w>φ(x), where φ(x) is a
(possibly infinite) feature space mapping to the Hilbert
space corresponding to the kernel function used. Sim-
ilar to other work on private regression [34] we assume
that |x|, |y| ≤ 1. The ridge regression algorithm can
now be written as:
w = argmin
w∈H
λ
2
‖w‖2H +
1
n
n∑
i=1
(w>φ(xi)− yi)2, (5)
where H is the corresponding Hilbert space. Prac-
tically speaking, even though w may be infinite-
dimensional, because it always appears in an inner
product with the feature mapping φ(x) we can utilize
the ‘kernel trick’: k(xi, xj) = φ(xi)
>φ(xj) to avoid
having to represent w explicitly.
Let fˆ(w∗, ·) and fˆ(w˜∗, ·) be the classifiers resulting
from the optimization problem in eq. (5) when trained
on (x,y) and (x˜, y˜), respectively (and similarly for
gˆ). We show that the residuals in Algorithm 1 are
bounded.
Theorem 5. Say λ ≤ 1. Given that the classi-
fiers fˆ(w∗, ·), fˆ(w˜∗, ·) are the result of the optimiza-
tion problem in eq. (5), the residuals of these functions
r′Y , r˜
′
Y are bounded as,
|r′i,Y − r˜′i,Y | ≤
8
nλ3/2
(6)
for all i, where r′i,Y , r˜
′
i,Y are the ith elements of r
′
Y , r˜
′
Y
and m is the size of the test set.
This bound holds equally for r′X , r˜
′
X . The proof of the
above is inspired by the work of Shalev-Shwartz et al.
[31] and Jain & Thakurta [14]. We place the proof in
the appendix for the interested reader. As far as we are
aware this is the tightest bound for the optimization
problem in eq. (5), with a non-Lipschitz loss. In the
following, we use this bound to preserve training set
privacy for the dependence scores considered in the
previous section.
5.1 Rank Correlation Coefficients
Note that the bound in Theorem 5 directly implies that
the ranking dependence scores have global sensitivity 1
(equal to the size of their ranges). To see this note that
we can consider an adversarial situation in which the
rank of every element of the residual r′Y changes when
the training set is altered in one element (as all the
residual elements may change). This means that the
Laplace mechanism cannot guarantee useful privacy.
Instead, note that both ranking scores may still have
reasonably bounded local sensitivity. Specifically, if
we consider the list of sorted residuals, it may be that
there are large gaps between neighboring residuals. If
this is the case then changing the training set by one
point may not change the residual rankings. Thus, the
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Figure 1: Probability of correctly identifying the causal direction on datasets selected from the Cause-Effect
Pairs Challenge [12]. Datasets for which the scores perform well were selected in order to isolate the effect of
privatization on the scores.
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Figure 2: Training set privacy for the HSIC score. The three left-most plots show how λ affects the probability
of correctly inferring the causal direction, while the right-most plot depicts this probability when the best λ is
selected over a  ∈ [0.1, 10]. See text for more details.
ranking scores are in some sense stable to changes in
the training set (for certain sets).
Definition 4. We call a function f k-stable on
dataset D if modifying any k elements in D does not
change the value of f . Specifically, f(D) = f(D∗) for
all D∗ such that D can be transformed into D∗ with
a minimum of k element substitutions. We say f is
unstable on D if it is not even 1-stable on D. The
distance to instability of a dataset D w.r.t. a func-
tion f is the number of elements that must be changed
to reach an unstable dataset.
With these definitions, we will use a modification of
the Propose-Test-Release framework that makes use
of this stability as described in Algorithm 13 in Dwork
& Roth [5].
Theorem 6. [5] Algorithm 13 [5] is (, δ)-
differentially private. Further, for all β > 0 if
s(x′, r′Y ) is
log(1/δ)+log(1/β)
 -stable on r
′
Y , then
Algorithm 13 releases s(x′, r′Y ) w.p. at least 1− β.
A lower bound on the distance to instability d is easily
given by noting that s(x′, r′Y ) always outputs the same
result as long as none of the ranks of r′Y change. Let
γ be the smallest absolute distance between any two
ranks. Then a lower bound on d is, d > bnγλ3/2/16c.
This is the largest number of training points that may
change so that the closest ranks moving towards each
other do not overlap (given that they change by at
most the amount in eq. 6). This lower-bound is suffi-
cient to use Algorithm 13 [5] to privatize the ranking
dependence scores.
5.2 HSIC Score
Theorem 7. For m ≥ 2, with kernels k, l ≤ 1 where
l is Ll-Lipschitz, the HSIC score has a training set
sensitivity as follows,∣∣∣ĤSICk,l(x′, r′Y )− ĤSICk,l(x′, r˜′Y )∣∣∣ ≤ R32Ll√mn
where R = 8
λ3/2
.
The proof follows directly from Theorem 5 and Lemma
16 in Mooij et al. [23]. Thus, the Laplace mechanism
gives us (, 0)-differential privacy and Theorem 2 gives
us our utility guarantee.
5.3 IQR Score
Similar to the test set privacy section we will use
propose-test-release to give a useful, private IQR score.
In fact, we will use IQR algorithm almost identically,
except that we will define Aj as the number of train-
ing points required to move the IQR out of an interval.
Note that a lower bound on Aj is simply the number of
points required to move every input less than the me-
dian to the left and every input larger than the median
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Table 2: The non-private accuracies of the ANM model on a subset of the Cause-Effect Pairs Challenge [12], as
well as the probability of correct causal inference after privatization.
dataset ids 4031 597 2209 2967 161 2132 1656 901 3484 1627
size 7713 7748 7766 7771 7782 7784 7803 7820 7853 7862
 =∞ (non-private accuracies)
Spearman’s ρ 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.70± 0.48 0.90± 0.32 1.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.30± 0.48 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
Kendall’s τ 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.70± 0.48 0.80± 0.42 1.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.80± 0.42 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
HSIC [11] 1.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.70± 0.48 0.60± 0.52 1.00± 0.00 0.40± 0.52 1.00± 0.00 0.10± 0.32
IQR [1] 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.10± 0.32 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.90± 0.32 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
 = 0.1
Spearman’s ρ 0.56± 0.45 0.03± 0.00 0.20± 0.02 0.57± 0.10 0.61± 0.06 0.92± 0.02 0.40± 0.06 0.34± 0.21 0.01± 0.00 0.82± 0.02
Kendall’s τ 0.54± 0.48 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.69± 0.38 0.78± 0.24 1.00± 0.00 0.12± 0.09 0.76± 0.41 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
HSIC [11] 0.68± 0.17 0.49± 0.00 0.60± 0.01 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.01 0.50± 0.00 0.52± 0.00 0.43± 0.06 0.66± 0.03 0.50± 0.00
IQR [1] 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.51± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.50± 0.00
 = 1
Spearman’s ρ 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.69± 0.43 0.91± 0.17 1.00± 0.00 0.06± 0.07 0.30± 0.41 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
Kendall’s τ 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.70± 0.48 0.81± 0.40 1.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.80± 0.42 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
HSIC [11] 0.85± 0.16 0.39± 0.03 0.98± 0.00 0.52± 0.01 0.55± 0.06 0.50± 0.01 0.66± 0.02 0.21± 0.25 1.00± 0.01 0.49± 0.01
IQR [1] 0.54± 0.04 0.48± 0.00 0.49± 0.00 0.52± 0.00 0.58± 0.01 0.51± 0.01 0.48± 0.00 0.50± 0.00 0.47± 0.01 0.51± 0.00
 = 2
Spearman’s ρ 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.69± 0.47 0.93± 0.17 1.00± 0.00 0.01± 0.02 0.31± 0.45 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
Kendall’s τ 0.50± 0.53 0.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.70± 0.48 0.80± 0.42 1.00± 0.00 0.00± 0.00 0.80± 0.42 0.00± 0.00 1.00± 0.00
HSIC [11] 0.92± 0.09 0.29± 0.04 1.00± 0.00 0.55± 0.01 0.59± 0.11 0.51± 0.01 0.78± 0.02 0.20± 0.26 1.00± 0.00 0.48± 0.02
IQR [1] 0.58± 0.09 0.46± 0.01 0.49± 0.01 0.54± 0.01 0.65± 0.02 0.52± 0.02 0.47± 0.01 0.51± 0.01 0.45± 0.01 0.52± 0.01
to the right (or the reverse of these), using the bound
on r in eq. (6). The aforementioned privacy and util-
ity results of the IQR propose-test-release framework
apply here. The only difference is we just need to add
noise to the IQR scores computed on the residuals,
which implies (6, 2δ)-privacy and that the results of
Theorem 4 can be tightened.
6 Results
We test our methods for private release of causal infer-
ence statistics on a small subsets from the Cause-Effect
Pairs Competition collection Guyon [12]. Specifically,
we randomly select 10 of the largest 25 datasets that
have a causal direction either X → Y or Y → X. We
average over 10 random 50/50 train/test splits of the
data. Table 2 shows the non-private accuracy of the
four dependence scores over these datasets. We show
the probability of correct causal inference changes as
these scores are made private w.r.t. the test set. Note
that these scores are often complementary, with the
ranking-based scores performing well on datasets in
which HSIC does worse, and vice-versa.
Figure 1 shows the effect of privatization on the de-
pendence scores: HSIC and IQR. Note that, for low
 (increased privacy), the probability of correct influ-
ence is lower as the amount of noise required blurs the
true dependence scores. However, as  increases, so
does this probability, in some cases drastically. For the
IQR score, recall that there is a probability that the
algorithm returns null: ⊥, if Rj is less than a threshold
controlled by δ. We investigated this probability, by
varying δ ∈ [10−5, 10−2] and sampling 10, 000 points
from the appropriate Laplace distribution. We found
that, for the IQR dataset in figure 1 every sample did
not move Rj below the null threshold. Therefore, the
probability of null is essentially 0.
The three left-most plots in Figure 2 demonstrate how
λ, which has a large effect on the training set sensi-
tivity (as described in eq. 6) affects the probability
of correct inference. We perform this experiment for
different settings of , and each one produces a dis-
tinctive ‘hump’ shape. This is because for small λ the
sensitivity bound (6) is too large to produce mean-
ingful causal inference. Similarly, for large λ the ker-
nelized regression algorithm (5) is overly-regularized,
which produces a poor regressor and poor dependence
scores. Only when λ is within a certain range do we
balance the size of the sensitivity bound with the size
of the regularization. This range grows larger as 
increases as the privacy setting becomes less strict (re-
quiring less noise). The right-most plot shows the cor-
rect inference probability using the best λ for a range
of  ∈ [0.1, 10]. With proper selection of λ we can
achieve high-quality causal inference that maintains
privacy w.r.t. the training set.
7 Conclusion
We have presented, to the best of our knowledge, the
first work towards differentially private causal infer-
ence. There are numerous directions of future work in-
cluding privatizing other causal inference frameworks
(e.g. IGCI [16]), analyzing that ANM algorithm with-
out train/test splits, as well as other dependence
scores. As there is significant overlap in the appli-
cations of causal inference and private learning we be-
lieve this work constitutes an important step towards
making causal inference practical.
Acknowledgments
KQW and MJK are supported by NSF grants IIA-
1355406, IIS-1149882, EFRI-1137211. We thank the
anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.
Matt J. Kusner, Yu Sun, Karthik Sridharan, Kilian Q. Weinberger
References
[1] Bu¨hlmann, Peter, Peters, Jonas, Ernest, Jan, et al.
Cam: Causal additive models, high-dimensional or-
der search and penalized regression. The Annals of
Statistics, 42(6):2526–2556, 2014.
[2] Chaudhuri, Kamalika, Monteleoni, Claire, and Sar-
wate, Anand D. Differentially private empirical risk
minimization. JMLR, 12:1069–1109, 2011.
[3] Dinur, Irit and Nissim, Kobbi. Revealing infor-
mation while preserving privacy. In Proceedings of
the SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on prin-
ciples of database systems, pp. 202–210. ACM, 2003.
[4] Dwork, Cynthia and Lei, Jing. Differential privacy
and robust statistics. In Proceedings of the forty-first
annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp.
371–380. ACM, 2009.
[5] Dwork, Cynthia and Roth, Aaron. The algorithmic
foundations of differential privacy. Theoretical Com-
puter Science, 9(3-4):211–407, 2013.
[6] Dwork, Cynthia, McSherry, Frank, Nissim, Kobbi,
and Smith, Adam. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in
private data analysis. In Theory of Cryptography, pp.
265–284. Springer, 2006.
[7] for Disease Control, Centers, Prevention, et al. How
tobacco smoke causes disease: The biology and behav-
ioral basis for smoking-attributable disease: A report
of the surgeon general. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (US), 2010.
[8] Friedman, Nir and Nachman, Iftach. Gaussian process
networks. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth conference
on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence, pp. 211–219.
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2000.
[9] Geiger, Philipp, Janzing, Dominik, and Scho¨lkopf,
Bernhard. Estimating causal effects by bounding
confounding. In Proceedings of the 30th Conference
on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 240–249,
2014.
[10] Geiger, Philipp, Zhang, Kun, Schoelkopf, Bernhard,
Gong, Mingming, and Janzing, Dominik. Causal in-
ference by identification of vector autoregressive pro-
cesses with hidden components. In ICML, pp. 1917–
1925, 2015.
[11] Gretton, Arthur, Bousquet, Olivier, Smola, Alex, and
Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Measuring statistical depen-
dence with hilbert-schmidt norms. In Algorithmic
learning theory, pp. 63–77. Springer, 2005.
[12] Guyon, I. Cause-effect pairs kaggle competi-
tion, 2013. URL https://www.kaggle.com/c/
cause-effect-pairs/.
[13] Hoyer, Patrik O, Janzing, Dominik, Mooij, Joris M,
Peters, Jonas, and Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Nonlinear
causal discovery with additive noise models. In Ad-
vances in neural information processing systems, pp.
689–696, 2009.
[14] Jain, Prateek and Thakurta, Abhradeep. Differen-
tially private learning with kernels. In Proceedings of
the 30th International Conference on Machine Learn-
ing (ICML-13), pp. 118–126, 2013.
[15] Jain, Prateek, Kothari, Pravesh, and Thakurta,
Abhradeep. Differentially private online learning.
COLT, 2012.
[16] Janzing, Dominik, Mooij, Joris, Zhang, Kun, Lemeire,
Jan, Zscheischler, Jakob, Daniusˇis, Povilas, Steudel,
Bastian, and Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Information-
geometric approach to inferring causal directions. Ar-
tificial Intelligence, 182:1–31, 2012.
[17] Kano, Yutaka and Shimizu, Shohei. Causal inference
using nonnormality. In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Symposium on Science of Modeling, the 30th
Anniversary of the Information Criterion, pp. 261–
270, 2003.
[18] Kpotufe, Samory, Sgouritsa, Eleni, Janzing, Dominik,
and Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Consistency of causal infer-
ence under the additive noise model. In ICML, 2014.
[19] Lopez-Paz, David, Muandet, Krikamol, Scho¨lkopf,
Bernhard, and Tolstikhin, Iliya. Towards a learning
theory of cause-effect inference. In ICML, 2015.
[20] McSherry, Frank and Talwar, Kunal. Mechanism de-
sign via differential privacy. In FOCS, pp. 94–103.
IEEE, 2007.
[21] Mooij, Joris M, Stegle, Oliver, Janzing, Dominik,
Zhang, Kun, and Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Probabilis-
tic latent variable models for distinguishing between
cause and effect. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pp. 1687–1695, 2010.
[22] Mooij, Joris M, Janzing, Dominik, Heskes, Tom, and
Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. On causal discovery with cyclic
additive noise models. In Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, pp. 639–647, 2011.
[23] Mooij, Joris M, Peters, Jonas, Janzing, Dominik,
Zscheischler, Jakob, and Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Dis-
tinguishing cause from effect using observational
data: methods and benchmarks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.3773, 2014.
[24] Nissim, Kobbi, Raskhodnikova, Sofya, and Smith,
Adam. Smooth sensitivity and sampling in private
data analysis. In Proceedings of the thirty-ninth an-
nual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp.
75–84. ACM, 2007.
[25] Pearl, Judea. Causality: models, reasoning, and in-
ference. 2000.
[26] Peters, Jonas, Mooij, Joris M, Janzing, Dominik, and
Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Causal discovery with continu-
ous additive noise models. The Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 15(1):2009–2053, 2014.
[27] Rasmussen, Carl Edward and Williams, Christopher
K. I. Gaussian processes for machine learning. 2006.
[28] Reichenbach, Hans and Reichenbach, Maria. The di-
rection of time. Univ of California Press, 1956.
[29] Sgouritsa, Eleni, Janzing, Dominik, Hennig, Philipp,
and Scho¨lkopf, Bernhard. Inference of cause and effect
with unsupervised inverse regression. In AISTATS,
pp. 847–855, 2015.
[30] Shajarisales, Naji, Janzing, Dominik, Shoelkopf,
Bernhard, and Besserve, Michel. Telling cause from
effect in deterministic linear dynamical systems. In
ICML, 2015.
[31] Shalev-Shwartz, Shai, Shamir, Ohad, Srebro, Nathan,
and Sridharan, Karthik. Stochastic convex optimiza-
tion. In COLT, 2009.
Private Causal Inference
[32] Spirtes, Peter, Glymour, Clark N, and Scheines,
Richard. Causation, prediction, and search, vol-
ume 81. MIT press, 2000.
[33] Sun, Xiaohai, Janzing, Dominik, and Scho¨lkopf, Bern-
hard. Causal reasoning by evaluating the complexity
of conditional densities with kernel methods. Neuro-
computing, 71(7):1248–1256, 2008.
[34] Talwar, Kunal, Thakurta, Abhradeep, and Zhang, Li.
Private empirical risk minimization beyond the worst
case: The effect of the constraint set geometry. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1411.5417, 2014.
[35] Zhang, Kun and Hyva¨rinen, Aapo. On the identifiabil-
ity of the post-nonlinear causal model. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Ar-
tificial Intelligence, pp. 647–655. AUAI Press, 2009.
